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Abstract
How can online communication most effectively respond to misinformation posted on social media? Recent studies
examining the content of corrective messages provide mixed results—several studies suggest that politer, hedged mes-
sages may increase engagement with corrections, while others favor direct messaging which does not shed doubt on
the credibility of the corrective message. Furthermore, common debunking strategies often include keeping the message
simple and clear, while others recommend including a detailed explanation of why the initial misinformation is incor-
rect. To shed more light on how correction style affects correction efficacy, we manipulated both correction strength
(direct, hedged) and explanatory depth (simple explanation, detailed explanation) in response to participants from Lucid
(N = 2,228) who indicated they would share a false story in a survey experiment. We found minimal evidence suggesting
that correction strength or depth affects correction engagement, both in terms of likelihood of replying, and accepting or
resisting corrective information. However, we do find that analytic thinking and actively open-minded thinking are associ-
ated with greater acceptance of information in response to corrective messages, regardless of correction style. Our results
help elucidate the efficacy of user-generated corrections of misinformation on social media.
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1. Introduction
An estimated 3,6 billion people use social media as of
2020, with this number expected to only increase in the
next decade (Clement, 2020). Furthermore, people are
increasingly utilizing social media platforms as a primary
source of news consumption—indeed, it has been esti-
mated that about two-thirds of American adults at least
occasionally get news via social media, despite appre-
hensions about the accuracy of such news (Shearer &
Matsa, 2018). The advent of social media as a means
of news dissemination has led to widespread concern
over the spread of misinformation and ‘fake news’ (“fab-
ricated information that mimics news media content in
form but not in organizational process or intent”; Lazer
et al., 2018, p. 1094). Although fake news comprises
a relatively small proportion of Americans’ daily media
diet (0.15%; see Allen, Howland, Mobius, Rothschild, &
Watts, 2020), it may still be harmful. For instance, in
the months leading up to the 2016 USA Presidential
election, false news stories favoring Trump were shared
about 30 million times on Facebook; those favoring
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Clinton were shared 8 million times (Allcott & Gentzkow,
2017). More recently, misinformation and disinforma-
tion about Covid-19 has spread quickly on social media
(Frenkel, Alba, & Zhong, 2020), potentially with fatal con-
sequences. As a result, there is great interest in identify-
ing approaches to combat misinformation.
1.1. Combatting Misinformation at the Platform-Level
One approach is to implement platform-level interven-
tions (i.e., efforts implemented by socialmedia platforms
that may be applied to all users). The most widely imple-
mented such approach, applying fact-check tags on dis-
puted or false-rated news items, has substantial limi-
tations. Professional fact-checkers cannot possibly keep
up with the pace at which misinformation is produced.
In addition to limiting the reach of fact-checking, this
may promote increased perceptions of accuracy for unla-
beled false headlines (‘implied truth effect’; Pennycook,
Bear, Collins, & Rand, 2020). Relatedly, general warn-
ings instructing users to be cautious about the accu-
racy of news content they read and share may result
in decreased belief in true news stories (‘tainted truth
effect’; Clayton et al., 2019). Approaches based on inocu-
lation (i.e., preemptive exposure to and warnings of fake
news; Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019) and accuracy
nudges (i.e., reminding people to think about accuracy
before consuming or sharing news content; Pennycook
et al., in press; Pennycook,McPhetres, Zhang, Lu, &Rand,
2020), which induce people to be more discerning prior
to their contact with misinformation, show substantial
promise. So does utilizing layperson judgments (e.g., by
harnessing the wisdom of crowds through users or con-
tractors hired to provide quality ratings) to supplement
machine learning approaches to misinformation detec-
tion (Epstein, Pennycook, & Rand, 2020; Kim, Tabibian,
Oh, Schölkopf, & Gomez-Rodriguez, 2018; Pennycook
& Rand, 2019a). However, it seems unlikely that plat-
forms will ever be entirely able to control the misinfor-
mation problem.
1.2. Combatting Misinformation at the User-Level
In addition to interventions that can be applied by the
platforms, it is therefore important to determine what
kind of user-generated corrections may be most effec-
tive at combatting misinformation online. While correct-
ing misinformation may ideally be a source of positive
participation online, it may easily devolve into unpro-
ductive and even harmful discourse. This gives rise to
the question of what type of corrective message most
effectively combats dark participation, rather than gives
way to it? One dimension by which corrective mes-
sages may differ is that of strength—how forcefully the
corrective message corrects the shared misinformation.
Less forceful, hedged messaging may lead to increased
engagement with and acceptance of the corrective mes-
sage. For instance, Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz,
and Cook (2012) argue that effective corrections should
attempt to affirm the worldview and identity of the indi-
vidual being corrected—thus, a hedged correction may
be less abrasive towards the corrected individual and
their worldview and identity. Furthermore, Tan, Niculae,
Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Lee (2016) analyzed effec-
tive corrective discourse on Reddit, and found that hedg-
ing (i.e., a message that indicated uncertainty, such as
“it could be the case”; Tan et al., 2016, p. 622) was
more common in more persuasive arguments. This is
perhaps because hedging makes an argument easier
to accept through the use of a softer tone (Lakoff,
1975). However, it has also been suggested that hedg-
ing may add increased uncertainty to the corrective mes-
sage, thus reducing its efficacy (see Rashkin, Choi, Jang,
Volkova, & Choi, 2017). This would suggest that more
direct, less hedged corrections of misinformation may
provide the clearest form of correction. Alternatively,
recent evidence suggests that the tone of a correction
(uncivil, affirmational, or neutral) may not affect the
effectiveness of corrections to misinformation (Bode,
Vraga, & Tully, 2020). Ultimately, there remains lim-
ited causal evidence as to whether and how correction
strength may impact correction engagement.
Another dimension by which corrections may vary is
by explanation depth; for instance, whether the debunk-
ing message consists of a simple negation, or includes an
alternative account to fill in the gap left by correctingmis-
information (see Lewandowsky et al., 2012). In favor of
brief refutations, it has been argued that simple rebut-
tals of misinformation are most effective (Lewandowsky
et al., 2012). However, others have argued to avoid sim-
ple negations (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012) and instead pro-
vide detailed debunking messages (see Chan, Jones, Hall
Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017). Thus, it remains unclear
whether corrections should be simple negations of truth,
or if they should contain a more detailed explanation of
why the shared misinformation is false.
1.3. Current Research
In the current study, we investigate the causal role
of different corrective messaging strategies on engage-
ment with corrections. Using a survey experiment in
which participants are presented with a series of social
media posts, we induce most participants to indicate
that they would share a false headline. We then manipu-
late the style of corrective message participants receive
in response to their shared article. Corrective messages
varied by strength (direct correction, hedged correction)
and depth (simple explanation, detailed explanation).
All corrections also included a (non-functional) link to
a purported debunking article on Snopes, which should
also increase the efficacy of the corrective message (see
Vraga & Bode, 2018; for related research on ‘snoping,’
see Margolin, Hannak, & Weber, 2018).
We first predict that (H1) hedged corrections will be
perceived as less aggressive and more polite than direct
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corrections, and that (H2) detailed corrections will be
perceived as more informative and less unhelpful than
simple corrections. We also predict that (H3) hedged,
detailed correctionswill elicit greater reply likelihood and
(H4) predict greater acceptance of information, whereas
direct and simple corrections will predict increased resis-
tance of information. Finally, we anticipate that (H5)
more analytic or actively open-minded individuals will
have greater reply likelihood and acceptance of informa-
tion in response to more detailed corrections.
The current research extends existing literature
regarding debunking and corrections of fake news in
three main ways. First, the existing literature assessing
the effect of correction strength on correction engage-
ment is primarily observational rather than causal (e.g.,
Tan et al., 2016). We seek to causally determine whether
correction strength affects correction efficacy. Second,
there is limited work assessing the interaction between
various correctionwording strategies.We assess not only
whether there are main effects of correction strength
and depth on engagement, but also if these correction
styles may interact with one another. Third, we seek to
explore the interaction between correction style and sev-
eral key cognitivemechanismswhichmay impact the effi-
cacy of certain forms of corrections. In particular, we uti-
lize the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) to
assess whethermore analytic thinkers engagemorewith
more detailed explanations. We also explore the role of
actively open-minded thinking (Stanovich & West, 2007)
in receptivity to various corrective messaging styles.
2. Methods
Our study was pre-registered at https://osf.io/eupwn/
?view_only=cc6cd2cd0bae42788fcd28aacb505d9a. Fur-
thermore, our full materials, data, and analysis code is
available on the Open Science Framework (see https://
osf.io/fvwd2/?view_only=cc6cd2cd0bae42788fcd28aac
b505d9a).
2.1. Materials and Procedure
2.1.1. Participants
We recruited N = 2,228 participants (1,065 female,
Mage = 44.84) via the online convenience sampling plat-
form Lucid (Coppock & McClellan, 2019). Participants
were first instructed to imagine they were currently on
a social media platform such as Twitter or Facebook.
Participants were then told they would be presented
with a series of actual recent news headlines, as if they
were appearing in their social media newsfeed.
2.1.2. News Headlines
Participants were randomly shown up to 28 actual head-
lines that appeared on social media, half of which were
factually accurate (real news) and half of which were
entirely untrue (fake news). Additionally, half of the head-
lines were favorable to the Democratic Party, and half
were favorable to the Republican Party, based on pre-
test ratings (see Pennycook&Rand, 2019b). All fake news
headlines were taken from Snopes. Real news headlines
were selected frommainstream news sources (e.g., NPR,
The Washington Post). Headlines were presented in the
format of a social media post—namely, with a picture,
headline, byline, and source (Figure 1).
After each headline, participants were asked
whether or not they would share that article on social
media publicly, such that other users could see and
comment on it. If participants decided to share a real
news article or decided not to share a fake news article,
they were shown another headline. However, if partic-
ipants decided to share a fake news article, then they
proceeded to the rest of the study and saw no further
headlines. Participants who did not share any fake news
articles were not eligible to complete the correctionmes-
sage section of the study. This indication to share should
simulate participants sharing such news articles as if they
Figure 1. Example news headline with picture, headline, byline, and source.
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were actually on social media—indeed, recent research
has found that self-reported willingness to share polit-
ical news articles in online survey studies correlates
with actual sharing on Twitter (Mosleh, Pennycook, &
Rand, 2020).
2.1.3. Corrective Messages
Overall, 1,589 participants (71% of all participants)
shared at least one fake news article, and thus completed
the remainder of the study. After sharing a fake news
article, participants were instructed to imagine receiving
a public comment on their post. Participants were pre-
sented with one of four corrective messages, which var-
ied by strength (direct, hedged) and depth (simple expla-
nation, detailed explanation). These corrections were
stylized as tweets from a fictional user. The first sentence
of the message varied by strength—in the direct condi-
tion, themessage read: “Noway do I believe this article—
it’s definitely not true.” In the hedged condition, themes-
sage read: “I’m not sure about this article—it might not
be true.” The second sentence of the message varied
by depth—in the simple condition, the sentence read:
“I found a link on Snopes that says this headline is false.”
In the detailed condition, the message read: “I found a
link on Snopes that says this headline was created by a
website that purposefully makes false stories.” All mes-
sages ended with a stylized Snopes link (Figure 2).
2.1.4. Reply to Corrective Message
Next, participants were asked: “Would you reply to
the above message?” 1 = “Yes, I would write a reply,”
0 = “No, I would not write a reply.” If participants indi-
cated “Yes,” they were asked to enter their reply via
free response. If participants indicated “No,” they were
asked: “If you DID reply, what would you write?” and
then allowed to enter their reply via free response.
2.1.5. Correction Motive
Participants were asked: “Why do you think the person
wrote the message you received? Select all that apply.”
Participants could select from the following: “To inform
me of valuable information,” “To reinforce the image of
themselves they’d like to present to me,” “To develop
a connection with me,” “To achieve self-fulfillment for
themselves,” or “To get the word out about a spe-
cific cause.’’
2.1.6. Evaluation of Corrector
After that, participants were asked to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of the person who wrote them the correc-
tive message (Likert-scale: 1–7), as well as how posi-
tive and how negative their opinion was of the per-
son who wrote them the message (Likert-scale: 1–7).
Participants were also asked how much they agreed
with the following statements: “The message I received
on my social media post was [unhelpful/aggressive/
informative/polite].” Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all agree,
7 = Strongly agree.
2.1.7. Self-Reported Belief-Updating
Then, participants were asked: “After viewing the com-
ment on your shared article and replying to that com-
ment, how do you view the accuracy of the article you
Figure 2. Corrective message conditions. Note: Clockwise, from top left: direct, simple; hedged, simple; hedged, detailed;
direct, detailed.
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shared?” Likert-scale: 1 = Much less accurate than ini-
tially thought, 2 = Slightly less accurate than initially
thought, 3 = As accurate as initially thought, 4 = Slightly
more accurate than initially thought, 5 = Much more
accurate than initially thought.
2.1.8. Cognitive Reflection Test
The CRT is a brief task which measures participant ten-
dencies to engage in analytic thinking. CRT items include
an intuitive yet incorrect answer, which participants
must override in order to answer correctly (e.g., “The
ages of Mark and Adam add up to 28 years old. Mark is
20 years older than Adam. Howmany years old is Adam?”
The common, intuitive answer is eight, whereas the cor-
rect answer upon reflection is four).
Participants completed a reworded version of the
original CRT (Frederick, 2005; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene,
2012) and a four-item non-numeric CRT (Thomson &
Oppenheimer, 2016).
2.1.9. Actively Open-Minded Thinking
Participants also completed a shortened version of the
actively open-minded thinking scale (AOT; Stanovich &
West, 2007). The AOT measures actively open-minded
thinking, or the tendency to be open towards opinions
or positions different from one’s own (e.g., “A person
should always consider new possibilities.” 1 = I strongly
disagree, 7 = I strongly agree).
2.1.10. Additional Measures
Participants next completed a brief political knowl-
edge measure and standard demographics. Participants
also were asked which social networking sites they
use (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, Snapchat,
Other). Participants were asked how often they are on
social media and, if they indicated that they had either
a Facebook or a Twitter account, how often they share
content on Facebook or Twitter (“Never,” “Less often,”
“Every few weeks,” “1 to 2 days a week,” “3 to 6 days a
week,” “About once a day,” “2 to 5 times a day,” “5 to
10 times a day,” or “Over 10 times a day”).
2.2. Analysis of Free Response Replies
Following our main study, we recruited 819 participants
from Amazon Mechanical Turk to crowdsource coding
of the free response replies we collected on several
dimensions. Free response replies were rated an aver-
age of 5.14 times each (SD = 2.24), and each participant
rated 10 replies on seven key dimensions. Participants
were first given instructions carefully detailing each rat-
ing category. Participants then evaluated each headline
on these dimensions, via a Likert-scale (1–7). These
seven dimensions of evaluating replies were informed
by categories of responding to corrective information as
detailed by Prasad et al. (2009). Detailed explanations of
these seven dimensions (denying original belief, belief
updating, counter-arguing, attitude bolstering, selec-
tive exposure, disputing rationality, and inferred justi-




Participants first read instructions detailing how they
will be asked to evaluate replies to corrective mes-
sages using seven different categories of response types.
Participants then read the descriptions of these response
types, and answered a reading comprehension check.
Participants who failed this comprehension check were
presented with the response type descriptions a second
time. Finally, participants viewed 10 different replies and
rated each response by all seven response type cate-
gories. Participants also were asked: “Overall, how pos-
itive is this reply?” and “Overall, how negative is this
reply?” Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all [positive/negative],
7 = Very [positive/negative]. Participants also evaluated
whether the replier indicated they only shared the fake
article as a joke, or if the replier indicated that they
plan on looking up more information about the article
they shared.
All written replies from the Lucid study were rated
by Amazon Mechanical Turk raters, except replies which
were either blank or simply said “nothing.” These replies
were automatically coded as a 1 (not at all) across all cat-
egories. There were 320 such replies in total.
2.2.2. Intraclass Correlations
In order to assess the consistency of measurements
made by our Amazon Mechanical Turk raters assess-
ing the same replies, we computed intraclass correla-
tions (ICC; descriptive measure of how strongly units
in a group resemble one another) for each of the seven
response type categories, plus ratings of overall positivity
and negativity. In particular, we utilized a one-way ran-
dom effects ICC model (since each reply was measured
by a different set of randomly selected raters), as well as
average measures, as our analyses ultimately utilize the
average ratings for each reply (see Treventhan, 2017).
Across all nine categories, our ICC1k was fair on average,
meaning that reply ratings within response type cate-
gories adequately resembled one another, ICCavg = 0.46
(common guidelines interpret greater than 0.40 as fair;
Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981), ICCDenyOriginalBelief = 0.33,
ICCBeliefUpdating = 0.57, ICCCounter-arguing = 0.48,
ICCAttitudeBolstering = 0.36, ICCSelectiveExposure = 0.38,
ICCDisputingRationality = 0.30, ICCInferredJustification = 0.24,
ICCPositive = 0.73, ICCNegative = 0.72 (all ps < .001).
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3. Results
3.1. Hedged Corrections Perceived as Less Aggressive,
More Polite
In order to assess the effect of our correction style con-
ditions on perceptions of corrections, we performed
several analyses. We performed a linear regression
model predicting how aggressive participants perceived
the corrective messages they received, entering cor-
rection strength, depth, and their interaction as pre-
dictors. As expected, we found that participants who
received hedged corrections perceived the correction as
less aggressive, b = −0.30, SE = 0.05, t(1558) = −6.19,
p < .001. There was no main effect of correction depth,
nor interaction between conditions, ps > .273. Similarly,
we found, as expected, that participants who received
hedged corrections perceived the corrections as more
polite,b= 0.19, SE= 0.05, t(1557)= 4.00,p< .001. Again,
there was no main effect of correction depth nor inter-
action between conditions, ps > .523. Together, these
measures suggest that there was a noticeable difference
between direct and hedged corrective messages, such
that hedged corrections were perceived as less aggres-
sive and more polite, which supports our first hypothe-
sis (H1). Indeed, these results suggest that our hedged
condition was both definitionally manipulating hedging
(i.e., via indicating uncertainty in wording by stating “I’m
not sure”), as well as manipulating perceived aggres-
siveness and politeness of the correction. Additional
analyses also suggest that hedged corrections promote
slightly more positive perceptions of the corrector (see
the Supplementary File).
We also performed a general linear model predicting
how informative participants perceived the corrective
message they received. Surprisingly, we found no main
effects or interactions between correction conditions,
ps> .196.We next performed a similar analysis substitut-
ing informativeness with unhelpfulness, but again found
nomain effects or interactions, ps> .103. Therefore, our
results do not support our second hypothesis (H2), as we
did not observe that participants evaluated corrections
with more detailed explanatory depth as more informa-
tive or less unhelpful. These results suggest that while
explanatory depth was definitionally manipulated in our
design (i.e., the ‘detailed explanation’ correction con-
tained information beyond a simple negation), it is not
the case that explanatory depth manipulated the extent
to which participants perceived the correction as infor-
mative or helpful.
3.2. No Meaningful Effect of Correction Strength and
Depth on Reply Likelihood
The fraction of participants who said they would reply is
shown in Figure 3.
For our main analysis, we then entered correction






Direct, Simple Direct, Detailed Hedged, Simple
Condition
Hedged, Detailed
Figure 3. Likelihood of reply to the corrective message by condition. Notes: N = 1,589. Error bars reflect 95% confidence
intervals.
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interaction into a logistic regression to predict whether
participants indicated that they would reply to the cor-
rective message. Although we predicted that hedged
and detailed corrections would elicit greater likelihood
of replying, we found no main effect on reply like-
lihood of correction strength, b = 0.06, SE = 0.05,
z(1588)= 1.23, p= .219, nor depth, b=−0.03, SE = 0.05,
z(1588) = −0.53, p = .598 (Table 1).
Thus, our results do not support our third hypothe-
sis (H3), that hedged, detailed corrections would elicit
greater reply likelihood. We did find a (barely) signifi-
cant interaction between correction strength and depth,
b = 0.10, SE = 0.05, z(1588) = 1.97, p = .049, such
that when the correction depth was detailed, hedged
corrections elicited more responses than direct correc-
tions. However, given our large sample and the fact that
the p-value was only barely significant, this interaction
should be interpreted with substantial caution.
3.3. No Meaningful Effect of Correction Strength and
Depth on Reply Sentiment
As pre-registered, we averaged denying original belief
and belief updating ratings to create a composite correc-
tion acceptance score (Figure 4).
We then entered correction strength and depth
into a general linear model predicting correction accep-
tance score, allowing for an interaction between condi-
tions. We found no significant main effects of correction
strength, b= 0.06, SE = 0.03, t(1588)= 1.96, p= .051, or
correction depth (p = .600) and no interaction between
conditions (p = .424; Table 2). Our results did not sup-
port our fourth hypothesis (H4), which predicted that
hedged, detailed corrections would elicit greater accep-
tance of information.
We next averaged the remaining five response cat-
egories (counter-arguing, attitude bolstering, etc.) into
Table 1. Logistic regression predicting likelihood of reply to corrective message.
Estimate Standard Error z p
Intercept −0.55 0.05 −10.50 < .001***
Hedged 0.06 0.05 1.23 .219
Detailed Explanation −0.03 0.05 −0.53 .598
Hedged*Detailed 0.10 0.05 1.97 .049*





Direct, Simple Direct, Detailed Hedged, Simple
Condition
Hedged, Detailed
Figure 4. Average aggregated acceptance of corrective information (1–7 Likert-scale) by condition. Notes: N = 1,589. Error
bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 2. General linear model predicting information acceptance by correction style condition.
Estimate Standard Error t p
Intercept 2.50 0.03 84.76 < .001***
Hedged 0.06 0.03 1.96 .051
Detailed Explanation −0.02 0.03 −0.52 .600
Hedged*Detailed 0.02 0.03 0.80 .424
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Df = 1,588.
an aggregated resisting information score (Figure 5), and
predicted information resistance using a general linear
model with correction strength and depth, allowing for
an interaction.
We found no main effect of strength or depth, and
no interaction between conditions, ps > .408 (Table 3).
We also performed five separate general linear mod-
els for each of the individual resisting information reply
type categories. There were no significant main effects
or interactions across all five linear models, ps > .146.
Thus, our results again did not support our fourth hypoth-
esis (H4), as direct and simple corrections did not predict
increased resistance of information.
We also predicted overall positivity and overall nega-
tivity of reply using similar general linear models. Again,






Direct, Simple Direct, Detailed Hedged, Simple
Condition
Hedged, Detailed
Figure 5. Average aggregated resistance of corrective information (1–7 Likert-scale) by condition. Notes: N = 1,589. Error
bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
Table 3. General linear model predicting information resistance by correction style condition.
Estimate Standard Error t p
Intercept 2.47 0.03 92.05 < .001***
Hedged 0.02 0.03 0.83 .408
Detailed Explanation −0.01 0.03 −0.48 .632
Hedged*Detailed 0.01 0.03 0.56 .577
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Df = 1,588.
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3.4. No Effect of Correction Style on Self-Reported
Belief Updating
We next predicted self-reported belief change (reverse-
coded; 5 = Much less accurate than initially thought,
1 = Much more accurate than initially thought) using a
general linearmodel, with correction strength and depth
as predictors, allowing for their interaction (Figure 6).
We found no significant main effect of correction
strength, b = 0.02, SE = 0.03, t(1551) = 0.75, p = .456,
or depth, b = 0.03, SE = 0.03, t(1551) = 1.18, p = .240,
and no significant interaction between the conditions,
b = 0.05, SE = 0.03, t(1551) = 1.77, p = .078.
3.5. Cognitive Reflection Predicts Increased Acceptance
of Corrective Information
Next, we added CRT score as a predictor in our
logistic regression predicting binary reply from correc-
tion strength and depth, allowing for all interactions.
We found no significant main effect of, or interactions
with, CRT score on reply likelihood, ps > .132. We then
performed a similar analysis using a general linear model
to predict aggregated acceptance of information. In this
model, we found a notable main effect of CRT score,
such that higher CRT scorewas associatedwith increased
acceptance of corrective information, b= 0.17, SE= 0.03,
t(1587) = 5.77, p < .001. We did not observe any signifi-
cant interactions between CRT score and our correction
conditions, contrary to our fifth hypothesis (H5) which
predicted that more analytic participants would bemore
likely to accept detailed corrections (Table 4).
We next performed the same analysis except substi-
tuting accepting information with our composite resist-
ing information score. Interestingly, we again found a
positive main effect of CRT score, such that higher CRT
score was associated with increased resistance of correc-
tive information, b = 0.06, SE = 0.03, t(1587) = 2.34,
p = .019; and no significant interactions between CRT
score and our correction conditions (Table 5).
In order to further examine the relationship between
CRT score and reply sentiment, we performed a z-test to
compare the coefficient of CRT score on accepting infor-
mation to the coefficient of CRT score on resisting infor-
mation. We found that the coefficient of CRT score on
accepting information was significantly greater than that
of CRT score on resisting information, z = 2.67, p = .008.
Our results thus suggest that on balance, participants
with higher CRT scores are more accepting of correc-
tive information.
3.6. Actively Open-Minded Thinking Predicts Increased
Acceptance of Corrective Information
We again performed our main logistic regression model





Direct, Simple Direct, Detailed Hedged, Simple
Condition
Hedged, Detailed
Figure 6. Self-reported belief updating (1–5 Likert-scale) by condition. Notes: N = 1,552. Error bars reflect 95% confidence
intervals.
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Table 4. General linear model predicting acceptance of information from correction style conditions and CRT as potential
moderator.
Estimate Standard Error t p
Intercept 2.50 0.03 85.58 < .001***
Hedged 0.06 0.03 1.98 .048*
Detailed Explanation −0.02 0.03 −0.59 .558
CRT Score 0.17 0.03 5.77 < .001***
Hedged*Detailed 0.02 0.03 0.74 .461
Hedged*CRT 0.04 0.03 1.53 .126
Detailed*CRT −0.04 0.03 −1.20 .231
Hedged*Detailed*CRT −0.02 0.03 −0.77 .443
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Df = 1,587.
as a potential moderator, allowing for all interactions.
We found a main effect of AOT on likelihood of reply,
such that greater AOT score was associated with greater
reply likelihood, b = 0.15, SE = 0.05, z(1501) = 2.83,
p = .005. We found no interactions between correction
conditions and AOT, ps > .494. We also ran a general
linear model predicting aggregated acceptance of infor-
mation from correction strength, depth, and AOT score,
allowing for all interactions. We found a main effect
of AOT score, such that greater AOT score was predic-
tive of increased acceptance of corrective information,
b = 0.21, SE = 0.03, t(1501) = 7.00, p < .001; and no sig-
nificant interactions between correction conditions and
AOT, ps > .353 (Table 6). These latter results thus do not
support our fifth hypothesis (H5), as more actively open-
minded participants were not more likely to accept infor-
mation from detailed corrections.
We then performed the same analysis, substituting
acceptance of information with aggregated resistance
of information, but found no significant main effect of
AOT (p = .201) and no significant interactions between
correction conditions and AOT (ps > .243). Together,
these results demonstrate that AOT is associated with
increased acceptance, but not resistance, of correc-
tive information.
We also performed several analyses looking at par-
tisanship and social media use as potential moderators
(see the Supplementary File).
4. Discussion
Our results suggest several conclusions about the effects
of different styles of corrective messages on engage-
ment with and replies to corrections of misinformation
on social media. We find that hedged corrections are
perceived as politer and less aggressive than direct cor-
rections, and that hedged corrections result in a more
positive perception of the corrector. Despite this, how-
ever, we do not find that hedged corrections are any
more effective at eliciting replies to corrective mes-
sages, or promoting acceptance of corrective informa-
tion. We consistently found no main effect of correction
strength (direct, hedged) or explanatory depth (simple
explanation, detailed explanation) on reply likelihood or
reply sentiment. We did find some weak evidence of
an interaction between correction strength and depth.
This interaction was such that hedged, detailed cor-
rections and direct, simple corrections yielded greater
reply likelihood than direct, detailed corrections and
hedged, simple corrections. This suggests that partici-
pants were perhaps sensitive to both correction strength
and explanatory depth, yet neither correction style sig-
nificantly impacted reply likelihood or the acceptance or
rejection of the correction.
Overall, given our consistently minimal effects of cor-
rection strength and depth on responses to corrections,
our findings suggest that correction style and wording
Table 5. General linear model predicting resistance of information from correction style conditions and CRT as potential
moderator.
Estimate Standard Error t p
Intercept 2.47 0.03 92.07 < .001***
Hedged 0.02 0.03 0.82 .414
Detailed Explanation −0.01 0.03 −0.52 .604
CRT Score 0.06 0.03 2.34 .019*
Hedged*Detailed 0.01 0.03 0.52 .606
Hedged*CRT 0.03 0.03 1.02 .308
Detailed*CRT −0.02 0.03 −0.68 .498
Hedged*Detailed*CRT −0.01 0.03 −0.29 .769
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Df = 1,587.
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Table 6. General linear model predicting acceptance of information from correction style conditions and AOT as potential
moderator.
Estimate Standard Error t p
Intercept 2.53 0.03 84.81 < .001***
Hedged 0.05 0.03 1.83 .068
Detailed Explanation −0.02 0.03 −0.58 .563
AOT Score 0.21 0.03 7.00 < .001***
Hedged*Detailed 0.002 0.03 0.08 .935
Hedged* AOT 0.03 0.03 0.93 .353
Detailed* AOT 0.003 0.03 0.09 .930
Hedged*Detailed* AOT −0.01 0.03 −0.19 .854
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Df = 1,501.
do not have a substantial impact on how corrections
of misinformation on social media are received. These
findings are consistent with recent research on correc-
tion wording and tone, which found that correction tone
did not substantially affect misperceptions (see Bode
et al., 2020). Our current findings extend this research
in several keyways. First, we demonstrate that correc-
tion strength (roughly analogous to tone) does not sig-
nificantly affect engagement with corrections of politi-
cal misinformation, whereas prior work has looked at
apolitical misinformation (Bode et al., 2020). Second,
we also show that differences in correction strength
do not impact engagement or belief updating by the
user who shared the corrected misinformation them-
selves. This in contrast with previous work, which has
instead assessed the effect of corrections on third-party
viewers (observational correction, i.e., how third-party
users on social media are affected by corrections; see
Vraga & Bode, 2017). Third, we also show that manip-
ulating the explanatory depth of the correction also
has a minimal effect on engagement with the correc-
tive message.
Our research also extends previous research on cog-
nitive style and misinformation, which has found that
people who are more reflective are less likely to believe
false news headlines (Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand,
& Cannon, 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2019b, 2020),
and that deliberation causally reduces belief in false
claims (Bago, Rand, & Pennycook, 2020)—regardless of
their partisan alignment. Here we examine the relation-
ship between cognitive style on the response to correc-
tions (rather than the perceptions of the misinformation
itself). We found that analytic thinking and actively open-
minded thinking (as assessed by CRT and AOT scales) pre-
dicted increased acceptance of corrective information.
This willingness to update one’s beliefs in the face of cor-
rective information may help to explain why more reflec-
tive individuals have more accurate beliefs. Importantly,
our results also suggest that analytic and actively open-
minded thinking relate to increased acceptance of cor-
rective information regardless of correction style.
Finally, our findings suggest that attempts at mis-
information correction are not doomed to simply fur-
ther promote dark engagement and incite comment sec-
tion ‘flame wars’ (Flame war, n.d.). Indeed, self-reported
belief updating was positive on average (M = 3.54),
and average belief updating in reply texts as scored
by Amazon Mechanical Turk raters (M = 2.63) was
greater than the individual averages of all forms of resist-
ing information (max: MCounter-arguing = 2.60). Thus, in
line with previous research (e.g., Bode & Vraga, 2018),
social media may not only serve as a medium for
misinformation—online platforms may also enable and
encourage user-generated corrections which, regardless
of strength or explanatory depth, may be effective at
combatting misinformation.
4.1. Limitations
The current research has several notable limitations.
First, while we use a sample that is quota-matched to the
American national distribution on age, gender, ethnicity,
and geographic region, our findings may not generalize
to other populations. Further research examining differ-
ent countries and cultures, as well as underrepresented
populations, is an important direction for future work.
Second, participants were not on their actual social
media platforms, did not share fake news articles on their
social media platforms, and knew that the correction
they received was from a fictional account. Therefore,
it is critical to test how the results of the current study
generalize to more ecologically valid settings. Further
research should examine the impact of manipulating cor-
rectivemessages via a field experiment on a social media
platform such as Twitter or Facebook.
Third, our study employs only one possible manip-
ulation of hedging, and one possible manipulation
of explanatory depth. Thus, it is plausible that other
formulations of hedging or explanatory depth may
yield differential engagement with corrective messages.
For instance, our hedged message may be overly uncer-
tain and perhaps more polite than other possible ways
to hedge (e.g., “I’m not sure” vs. “It could be the
case”). Thus, more certain and less polite hedged cor-
rections may elicit greater engagement than the hedging
manipulation we utilized. Furthermore, we definitionally
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manipulated explanatory depth by utilizing one con-
dition in which the explanation was a simple nega-
tion, and the other condition included generic details
about the source of the misinformation (i.e., “created
by a website that purposefully makes false stories”).
Given that perceptions of informativeness and unhelp-
fulness did not differ based on explanatory depth con-
dition, it may be the case that either more detailed or
more specific explanations may also lead to higher or
lower levels of engagement with the corrective mes-
sage. Future research may explore these possibilities in
greater depth.
Fourth, many of our null results were not that pre-
cisely estimated. Thus, our findings should not be inter-
preted as evidence of no difference between correc-
tion conditions. Rather, our minimal and null results
should be interpreted as a lack of evidence suggest-
ing correction style does affect correction engagement—
and, given our pre-registered prior hypotheses regard-
ing likely differences in correction outcomes based on
prior research, this lack of evidence was both surpris-
ing and complements recent research also indicating
that correction style does not substantially impact cor-
rection engagement. Nonetheless, our minimal and null
results should be interpreted with caution—we do not
claim to find evidence of no effect of correction style
on responses to misinformation, but rather present
our results suggesting that our experiment yielded an
absence of any evidence showing an effect of correc-
tion style.
5. Conclusions
In sum, we do not find evidence that hedging correc-
tions of misinformation or providing increased explana-
tory depth in corrections of misinformation had a mean-
ingful impact on engagement with corrective messages
on social media. Although we found differences in how
these messages were perceived in terms of aggressive-
ness or politeness, we did not find any substantial dif-
ference in likelihood of replying, overall acceptance of
corrective information, or overall resistance towards cor-
rective information. Our results also suggest that more
analytic individuals, andmore actively open-minded indi-
viduals, are more likely to accept corrective information,
irrespective of correction strength or explanatory depth.
Ultimately, our current study suggests that corrective
messages, regardless of precise style or wording, may
nonetheless be used as a source of positive engagement
and communication on social media in order to combat
dark participation.
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